A stronger capital position and immediate access to usable funding are different things. That distinction is central to Europe's current banking-union debate and to the design of credible stress scenarios.
What was published
On 6 November 2026, Claudia Buch, Chair of the ECB Supervisory Board, and Dominique Laboureix, Chair of the Single Resolution Board, argued that deeper integration should accompany regulatory simplification. Their priorities include common deposit insurance, smoother movement of capital and liquidity within banking groups, and more credible liquidity provision during and immediately after resolution.
Capital and liquidity should not be conflated
A viable institution emerging from resolution may still experience deposit withdrawals or impaired market funding. Cash and collateral may be located in different legal entities, and transfers can be restricted or delayed. An institution's consolidated buffer therefore cannot automatically be treated as cash available to meet every payment at every subsidiary.
Implications for quantitative risk review
Stress models should distinguish legal-entity liquidity, collateral eligibility, transfer restrictions, deposit-outflow timing, intraday payments and emergency funding assumptions. Compare scenarios with normal intragroup mobility against cases where cash is trapped, transfers are slow, or post-resolution liquidity support is not immediately available. These are modelling questions, not assertions about the solvency of any particular bank.
Scope and limitations
The ECB and SRB contribution is a policy argument. It does not announce a newly funded backstop or guarantee access to liquidity. Intragroup transfers and funding during resolution are related but separate mechanisms. Analysts should not insert proposed changes into a baseline model as though they were already operational.
Primary source and limitations
This original ASR commentary separates source facts from risk-model interpretation. Primary source: ECB Banking Supervision, Buch and Laboureix, 6 November 2026. Examples describe possible scenarios, not observed institution-level measurements.
ASR / MODEL & METHODOLOGY · EXHIBIT 03
Liquidity survival under transfer constraints
Original numerical illustration, not market-observed data. Inputs are explicit and calculated outputs can be independently reproduced.
Mathematical specification
Liquidity_t = Liquidity_(t-1) + inflow_t + available_transfer_t - outflow_tParameters and assumptions
| Input | Assumed value |
|---|---|
| Opening liquid buffer | 120m |
| Outflows T+1, T+2, T+3 | 55m, 50m, 35m |
| Other inflow at T+2 | 20m |
| Intragroup cash T+1 | 35m allowed or trapped |
| Operating liquidity floor | 25m |
Calculated scenario outcome
With 35m transferred, liquidity ends T+3 at EUR 35m. If it remains trapped, liquidity ends T+3 at EUR 0m, breaching a hypothetical EUR 25m minimum floor.
Model limitations
Original deterministic stress example inspired by the ECB/SRB policy discussion of 6 November. Amounts are invented, not institution-level observations or proof of access to a resolution backstop.